A study of the East Pakistan crisis of 1971 calls for at least a brief
summary of some of the events which led up to it.
The state of Pakistan came into existence through the inability of
the Hindu and Moslem communities to reach agreement on a common
constitution at the time of the British withdrawal from India.
The struggle for independence in the Indian sub-continent had been
waged between the two world wars. At first, both Hindus and Muslims
thought in terms of a federal state, but after the serious communal
riots which accompanied the provincial elections in 1937, Mr. Jinnah,
the Muslim leader, supported the demand for partition.
In 1940, the Muslim League held a Conference at Lahore when the
following resolution was passed, indicating that more than one Muslim
state was then in contemplation:
'That geographically contiguous units be demarcated into regions
which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as
may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are
numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones
of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.'
At that Conference Mr. Jinnah said that Hindus and Muslims could
never evolve a common nationality.
By 1946, opinion in the Muslim League had moved in favour of a single
state of Pakistan. On 9 April, 1946, at a meeting of the Muslim League
federal and provincial legislators, who were the elected representatives
of the vast majority of Muslims, a motion proposed by Mr. H. S.
Suhrawardy, himself a Bengali, was adopted in these terms:
'That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North East,
and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan
in the North West of India, namely Pakistan zones where the Muslims
are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign
independent state, and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to
implement the establishment of Pakistan.'
Efforts by the British Government to maintain the unity of the
sub-continent in a federal state proved abortive. The 1946 British
Cabinet Mission' suggested a three-tier federation, with a central
government responsible for foreign affairs, defence, and communication,
two regions, one comprising the predominantly Muslim provinces and one
the predominantly Hindu provinces each responsible for such other
matters as were assigned to them by the provinces, and provinces
with all residuary powers'.1 They proposed a constituent
assembly to draw up a constitution on this basis. At first the plan was
accepted by both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, but
shortly afterwards Mr. Nehru criticised the plan in terms which, it may
be noted, were later paralleled by the West Pakistan criticism of the
Awami League's Six Points. He argued that 'defence and communication
obviously included the control of many industries; foreign affairs
inevitably included foreign trade; the centre must necessarily control
currency and credit; it was highly improbable that there would be
grouping of provinces into regions'.2
When it became impossible to achieve agreement on a single state, the
British Government resolved to give independence on a basis of
partition. The state legislators representing those parts of the Punjab and Bengal where the Moslems were in a majority were consulted by the
British authorities. They were asked to state whether they would prefer
that the Punjab and Bengal respectively should remain as united
provinces under India or be partitioned in such a way that the
preponderating Muslim areas contiguous to each other would be formed
into separate provincial units within the state of Pakistan. The
legislators passed resolutions in favour of partitioning both the Punjab
and Bengal. In making this decision they showed that they attached
greater importance to belonging to a unified Islamic state than they did
to maintaining the unity of the former provinces, in spite of their
common history, language and culture. The religion of Islam was accorded
a primacy as the determining principle over all other principles.
Accordingly, the British parliament passed the Indian Independence
Act, 1947, and the two separate states of India and Pakistan came into
being, each being autonomous dominions with a Governor-General appointed by the Crown.
The name of Pakistan, first thought of in 1930, is composed of
letters from Islamic provinces or countries, Punjab, Afghania (the old
North West Frontier region of India), Kashmir, Iran, Sind, Turkharistan,
Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It may have been ominous for the future of
Pakistan, but Bengal was not one of the regions which lent its letters
to the name. Pakistan also means in Urdu' the land of the spiritually
pure and clean'.
The new state of Pakistan had one of the largest populations in the
world (then 76 million; in 1971 135 million). It was divided into two'
wings " vastly different from each other and separated by 1,200 miles of
Indian territory. West Pakistan, with an area of 310,000 square miles,
contained large areas of desert and barren mountainous regions. The
people are tall, lighter skinned, active and energetic, and in many ways
closer in spirit to the countries of the Middle East than to Asia. Their
language is Urdu, their staple crop wheat. East Pakistan, with an area of only 55,000 square miles, is a
densely populated fertile area, much of which is flooded annually by the
Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers and their numerous tributaries (into whose
delta flows five times the quantity of water flowing through the delta
of the Mississippi). The people are short, dark skinned, easy going and,
no doubt, influenced by the hot humid climate, less energetic than the
West Pakistanis. Their staple crop is rice. Their language is Bengali,
with a rich literature and culture of its own. Although the Muslims were
in the vast majority in East Bengal, it was the Hindu minority who
before independence provided most of the land-owning, mercantile and
educated class.3 East Bengal formed part of a larger region,
geographically, economically and linguistically, of which Calcutta was
the capital and outlet to the rest of the world.
At the time of partition, millions of Muslims migrated from India to
settle in Pakistan. Among those who went to East Pakistan were many
Urdu-speaking Muslims. These came to be referred to generally as Biharis,
although only a part came from Bihar. Owing to the language difference,
assimilation proved difficult in areas where there were large
concentrations of Biharis and hostility and resentment developed between
the Biharis and the Bengalis. In addition to the differences in
language, race, temperament, culture, diet, geography and climate, there
were few historic or economic links between the two wings of Pakistan.
Their real common bond was their religion. As subsequent events have
shown, this proved an insufficient cement to bind together the two
halves of the new state. Even here there were differences, in that the
Bengali Muslims tended to be less fanatical in their religious zeal.
Although there had at times been severe and violent communal clashes,
the Bengali Muslims had generally come to accept their Hindu minority
and neighbours, with whom they had many ties and associations.
Although the majority of the population (55 %) lived in East
Pakistan, the new state was dominated from the start by the Western
wing. There were many reasons for this. The capital, almost inevitably,
was in the west which contained the only large port, Karachi, the
military headquarters, Rawalpindi, what little industry there was, and
the better economic substructure. The army, which came to play an
increasingly dominant part in the new state, was drawn from the more
militaristic peoples of the west, and the civil service also was very
largely western, in part due to the fact that a substantial part of the
administrative class in the former East Bengal had been Hindu.
Instead of setting out to rectify the imbalance, the leaders of the
new state appeared insensitive to the aspirations of the Bengali
majority. As early as 1948, in a speech at Dacca University, Mr. Jinnah
told the Bengalis: 'Make no mistake about it. There can only be one
state language and that can only be Urdu.' President Ayub Khan later
declared: 'It is quite clear to me that with two national languages we
cannot become a one-nation state; we shall continue to remain a
multi-nation state.' But the leaders of Pakistan did not follow the
logic of this and allow the two wings to develop as two federated
nations. Instead, East Pakistan came to experience what seemed to them
to be a colonialist domination by a remote alien element, who neither
understood nor sympathised with their national aspirations and who as
they believed, deprived them of what they regarded as their fair share
of investment and economic development.
Moreover, the disastrous conflict with India over Kashmir, which was
of burning importance to the Western wing, was a remote issue to the
Eastern wing, and the economic break with India which followed it had
the effect of cutting East Pakistan off from their natural trading
partners in the adjoining Indian provinces. East Pakistan became a
captive market for the high priced goods of the new West Pakistan
industry, and found that their area, whose jute and tea crops provided
two thirds of the country's exports, received less than a third of its
imports, less than half of its development funds and less than a quarter
of its foreign aid.
The initial period of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan on the
British model was hardly a success. owing to the early death of Mr.
Jinnah and the assassination of the first Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat
Ali Khan, the country was deprived of its two leaders of stature. The
political life 'degenerated rapidly into a squalid tangle of
self-seeking and corruption. Tensions, basically economic but needing
sound political solutions, built up between the two wings and between
the provincial units within the west wing itself. Wrangling and delay in
the legislature over framing of a constitution declined into a game of
political intrigue. By 1958, the nation's affairs had reached a state of
chaos. ..' .4
The army, led by General Ayub Khan, decided to take charge and there
followed 13 years of military rule, lasting until the fall of President
Yahya Khan in December 1971. The new military regime, aided by the civil
servants, achieved a great deal in tackling many of Pakistan's economic
and social problems. The first military governor of East Pakistan, Lt.
Gen. Azam Khan, was a popular figure and succeeded in redressing many
local grievances, but he was replaced in 1961. The inherent conflicts
between the two wings remained, and as time went on were accentuated by
the neglect of Bengali interests. When eventually the leaders did make
attempts to rectify this situation, as both Ayub and Yahya Khan did,
their efforts proved to be too little and late.
From the time of the new Constitution in 1962, Pakistan outwardly
enjoyed a system of democratic government known as 'basic
democracy', but in reality the government remained a military
dictatorship.
Corruption, which had first been largely eradicated under Ayub's
presidency, became rife again. Social inequality increased, with two
thirds of the country's industrial wealth and four fifths of its banking
and insurance concentrated in the famous 22 west wing families. After
the Kashmir war of 1965, the army's prestige diminished, rioting became
prevalent in both wings, and harsh repressive measures were adopted.
In 1969, faced with growing disorder, President Ayub Khan attempted
to negotiate with opposition leaders on the basis of constitutional and
economic reform. Political prisoners were released, including the former
Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, and the Awami League leader, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, who was then being tried on the Agatarla conspiracy
case. But the attempt failed. The army was not prepared to yield to the
demands from the opposition parties of both wings for full democracy
with direct elections, abrogation of the emergency regulations and of
press censorship, and wide-spread nationalisation. Still less would they
grant the demand from the Eastern wing for substantial autonomy on the
basis of the Awami League's Six Points. Rioting continued and the
resultant breakdown led President Ayub Khan to hand over power to
General Yahya Khan.
With the reimposition of martial law, order was soon restored.
Confidence was established by General Yahya Khan's declared intention to
return the country as soon as possible to civilian rule. Within four
months of taking over, he ordered preparation of electoral lists on the
basis of universal franchise. In November he promised a general election
on October 5, 1970, to elect a constituent assembly, and allowed the
parties to start campaigning on January I. The elections were for the
first time to be held on the one-man, one-vote principle, which assured
East Pakistan a majority of votes and of seats. West Pakistan was to be
divided into provinces and cease to be one administrative unit, and the
two wings were to be granted' maximum autonomy ... consistent with the
integrity and solidarity of the nation '.
On March 28, 1970, President Yahya Khan published the Legal Framework
Order, laying down the conditions and procedure for establishing a new
constitution. The essential conflict between the two wings is revealed
by comparing the 'fundamental principles of the Constitution' contained
in clause 20 of the Order with the Awami League's Six Points Both agreed
that Pakistan should be a federal republic but the differences lay in
the conception of the Central Government's powers The Six Points
declared that the Federal Government should be responsible only for
defence and foreign affairs; there should be two separate mutually
convertible currencies or, if one currency, regional reserve banks to
prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region
to the other Fiscal policy was to be the responsibility of the
federating units, who were to provide the central government with the
necessary resources for defence and foreign affairs The regional
governments were to be responsible for foreign trade and aid, and were
to be empowered to maintain their own militia or para-military force The
'fundamental principles' in the Legal Framework Order proclaimed that
'Pakistan shall be so united in a Federation that the independence, the
territorial integrity and the national solidarity of Pakistan are
ensured, and that the unity of the Federation is not in any way impaired
'. The provinces were to have. maximum autonomy, that's to say maximum
legislative, administrative and financial powers 'but the federal
government was to have adequate powers, including legislative,
administrative and financial powers, to discharge its responsibilities
in relation to external and internal affairs and to preserve the
independence and integrity of the country,'
There was an obvious conflict here. The exclusion of foreign trade
and aid from the purview of the central government as proposed by the
Six Points, would deprive it of real control over foreign policy, and
its inability to levy taxes directly would subject its defence programme
to a veto by the provinces The Awami league leaders never succeeded in
showing convincingly how the Six Points would give the central
government any real control over foreign affairs and defence.
In spite of these implications of the Six Points, President Yahya
Khan allowed the Awami League to campaign on the basis of the Six Points
He could hardly have been expected to foresee Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's astonishing victory in the subsequent elections, giving the
Awami League an absolute majority in the Assembly He no doubt assumed
that, when it came to the point, Sheikh Mujibur, whom he knew to be a
realistic politician, would be prepared to compromise substantially on
the issue of central government powers.
Owing to the cataclysmic cyclone which ravaged the coastal district
of East Bengal on the night of 12/13 November, the elections were
postponed until December When the election was eventually completed, the
Awami league had won 167 out of the 169 East Pakistan seats, and Mr
Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party had won 85 of the 144 West Pakistan
seats.
This remarkable result was contributed to by the strong reaction of
the people of East Pakistan against what they believed to he the callous
indifference and neglect of President Yahya Khan and the West Pakistan
controlled government in dealing with the unprecedented horror of the
November cyclone.
Under the Legal Framework Order, the President was to decide when the
Assembly was to meet. Once assembled it was to frame a new Constitution
within 120 days or stand dissolved. On February 13,
1971, the President announced that the National Assembly was to meet
at Dacca on March 3. By this time the differences between the main
parties to the conflict had already crystallised.
On December 22, the Secretary of the Awami League, Mr. Tajuddin
Ahmed, claimed that his party having won an absolute majority had a
clear mandate and was quite competent to frame a constitution and to
form a central government on its own. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, with
greater realism, declared on January 3 that his party would not frame a
constitution on its own, even though it had a majority. He refused,
however, to negotiate on the Six Points, saying that they were now
public property and no longer negotiable.
This was the crux of the conflict. The majority party in the west,
led by Mr. Bhutto, was convinced that a Federation based on the Six
Points would be a Federation in name only. At best it would lead to a
feeble Confederation, unable and unwilling to maintain a tough policy
towards India; at worst it would result in the division of the country
into two states. These fears were evidently shared by the military
leaders in the west, including President Yahya Khan, as would be known
to Mr. Bhutto.
President Yahya Khan, who had publicly described Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman as the 'future Prime Minister of the country' on January 14,
seemed to be sparing no efforts in seeking to find a way out of the
impasse, but to no avail. In truth no compromise was possible so long as
both sides continued to regard the central issue of economic
independence for East Pakistan as not being negotiable. Mr. Bhutto
announced on February 15 that his party would not attend the Constituent
Assembly unless there was 'some amount of reciprocity' from the Awami
League. Sheikh Mujibur replied at a press conference on February 21,
asserting that 'Our stand is absolutely clear. The Constitution will be
framed on the basis of the Six Points.' He also denied that the Six
Points would leave the central government at the mercy of the provinces
and contended that they were designed only to safeguard provincial
autonomy. The Awami League leaders maintained throughout that the proper
forum for discussing the constitution was the Constituent Assembly.
Whatever willingness Sheikh Mujibur Rahman might have had to
compromise on the Six Points in other circumstances, his absolute
electoral victory made it impossible to do so. It was not that he was
too weak to oppose the extremists in his party; he had frequently done
so before with courage and success. But to renounce on the Six Points
which were essential to achieve real autonomy, particularly economic
autonomy, for East Pakistan, would have meant going back on everything
he had said in his long and now successful political struggle. The
deadlock, which was reached, arose from the impossibility of finding' a
way of reconciling east wing needs with west wing demands, of making one
nation out of what are essentially two '.5
There is some evidence to suggest that by February 15, the military
leaders in the west had already reached a decision that the Bengalis
should, if necessary, be frustrated by force of arms from achieving the
autonomy on which they were so plainly bent. President Yahya Khan, as
will be seen, continued to seek a political solution, or at least went
through the motions of doing so, but in the mean time the military
build-up of West Pakistan forces in East Pakistan also continued.
On February 19, the army moved out of their cantonment at Dacca and
began to set up check points and machine gun posts about the town.
On February 21, President Yahya Khan dismissed his ten man civilian
cabinet and called in all five provincial governors and martial law
administrators. The army had taken over full control.
On February 26, 27 and 28 the Awami League met in conference in Dacca
to settle their draft constitution for submission to the Constituent
Assembly. They did so amid growing apprehension owing to the increasing
military activity in Dacca and the rumours beginning to circulate that
the Assembly would be postponed.
On February 28, Mr. Bhutto demanded that either the 120-day limit for
the Constituent Assembly be removed or the opening session be postponed,
declaring that if it was held on March 3 as planned, there would be a
hartal (general strike) throughout West Pakistan from Preshawar to
Karachi '.
President Yahya Khan responded in a broadcast the next day by
postponing the Assembly indefinitely.
Footnotes:
1
Gledhill, A., 1957, Pakistan, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, p.
60.
2
Op cit., p. 61.
3
Rushbrook Williams, L., 1972, The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom
Stacey Ltd. London, p. 15.
4
Loshak, D., 1971, Pakistan Crisis, Heinemann. London, p.13.
5
Loshak, D., op cit., p.18.