Development Experience of Bangladesh
in Gunnar Myrdal's
Asian Drama Perspective
Mohammad Omar Farooq, PhD
Associate Professor of Economics and Finance
Upper Iowa University
Draft: Not for Citation
Paper presented at the Bengal Studies Conference
May 6, 2000
Abstract
Since the independence of Bangladesh nearly thirty years ago, the country is still going through serious instability, socio-political crisis and lack of a sense of direction. Time and again the country has shown sparks of success that are fundamentally constrained by various institutional (non-economic) bottlenecks.
Just a few years prior to the independence of Bangladesh, the monumental work of the Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, came out. At that time, Bangladesh, as East Pakistan, was subsumed in Pakistan as a component of the larger Asian "drama." From the institutionalist perspective of Myrdal, this paper examines the transformation experience of Bangladesh in light of the analytical framework of "Asian Drama."
Drawing on Myrdal's analysis of South Asia, especially India & Pakistan at that time, this paper particularly focuses on the relevance of Myrdal's prognosis for this part of the world and how Bangladesh has evolved, or failed to evolve, in light of that prognosis.
I. Introduction
Earlier this year, I wrote a paper articulating the point "that currently the primary impediments to Bangladesh economy are non-economic in nature. Avoidance of an impending economic crisis as well as achieving the desired economic transformation hinge on addressing those non-economic determinants." [Farooq, 2000] While writing that paper, I had to take a closer look at some of the works of Gunnar Myrdal. Exposure to certain aspects of his works made me more interested in revisiting, particularly, Asian Drama to develop a better sense of the development experience of Bangladesh in light of his work.
In 1968 when Gunnar Myrdal's Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations came out, it was regarded as quite a dramatic work. The title "was chosen in order to express the conception of events in South Asia held by the author at the beginning of his work and fortified in the course of study." Behind all the complexities and dissimilarities, Myrdal saw "a rather clear-cut set of conflicts and a common theme as a drama." In his words, "[T]he action in this drama is speeding toward a climax. Tension is mounting: economically, socially, and politically." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 35]
Like a visionary he remarked: "To some degree all of us are participants in this drama. It is as if the stage, set for South Asia, were enlarged and drew onto itself the entire world, so that no one could be merely a spectator." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 35] The "climax" envisioned by Myrdal may not have come yet, but the "mounting" tensions are stubbornly refusing to dismount. Within three years after Asian Drama was published, one of the most dramatic - or rather traumatic - events of contemporary South Asia took place. The separation of the East and the West wing of Pakistan occurred through one of the worst genocides and bloodbaths. The valiant struggle of the people of East Pakistan combined with effective midwifery of India culminated into Bangladesh being an independent nation state.
Myrdal's prognosis that no one would be able to remain as spectator as far as South Asia is concerned is turning out to be another visionary statement as both Pakistan and India are now declared nuclear powers and their conflict over Kashmir - both sides ignoring the Kashmiri people - has turned South Asia into the "most dangerous region on the planet." That partially would help explain the recent (March 2000), historic trip of none other than the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, to this region - of course, without much success in reducing the regional tension.
Myrdal's choice of the region and the countries was not random. "This drama has its unity in a set of inner conflicts operating on people's minds: between their high-pitched aspirations and the bitter experience of a harsh reality; between the desire for change and improvement and mental reservations and inhibitions about accepting the consequences and paying the price. Such conflicts are a part of human life in all times and places; but in the countries under study, they have an exceptional, mounting intensity and assume a unique form." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 34]
Bangladesh is a post-Asian Drama development. How does the transformational experience of Bangladesh as a new, independent actor (or actress) in the drama measure up in light of the analytical and policy framework of Asian Drama? That is the theme of this paper.
A few disclaimers are in order. Only a few aspects of Myrdal's analysis are dealt with here. All the emphases are mine, unless noted otherwise. I do not necessarily agree with every aspect of Myrdal's analysis. I have generously quoted Myrdal so that any misperception about my putting words in his mouth is avoided.
1
II. Bangladesh: a new and independent actor in the Drama
It is important to recognize that almost three years before Bangladesh became an independent nation in 1971, Myrdal, remarkably, seemed to have sensed the pulse of the keen observers of the region. "There are also many Indians who still doubt that Pakistan can hold together and who believe, in particular, that East Pakistan will break away from West Pakistan." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 248]
The independence struggle of Bangladesh was deeply rooted in the aspiration of reclaiming its heritage of being the golden Bengal in the past - a vintage that many justifiably believed was held hostage by exploitative ruling elite from outside, such as the British before 1947 or the West Pakistanis before 1971. Although the pursuit of independence was motivated by more than economic reasons, politically Bangladesh is a sovereign nation at the table of nations of the world. In the last twenty years since its independence the golden rhetoric has not lost its luster, but the long cherished political stability and economic transformation still remain a mirage even though the country has no outsiders to shift the blame to anymore.
Literacy rate in Bangladesh has improved, but it has not reached an acceptable level. The overall economic infrastructure has broadened with major accomplishments such as the Jamuna Bridge, but in many parts old infrastructure is crumbling. There are more private universities and colleges than ever before, but the certificates have lost their credibility. Buildings in many urban commercial and residential areas are becoming taller, but the widening economic dualism is causing the scope of slum dwelling to go out of control. The country now has precious police dogs at the disposal of the government, while some powerful, political persons aided by the police force storm into a legitimate corporate board's meeting and quite casually raid and take over a bank. There have been many developments in the private sector, while the governor of the central bank of Bangladesh is threatened by a leading industrialist at the governor's own office because the governor wants to create pressure on the big loan defaulters. The result: the governor is removed. There is a profound impact of the NGO movement on the economy of Bangladesh, especially on rural employment, literacy, and other indicators of human development. Parallel to this, the country now also has at its hand one of the most serious environmental disasters ever of this century: the arsenic problem.
According to a recent editorial in the New Nation, a small segment of Bangladeshi people has become "super rich," probably stashing a good part of their wealth outside the country. The editorial also makes the connection that this "super rich" segment has not become so by making any "super" contribution to the country's economy or productivity. Much of these stashed resources outside the country are a result of probably "super" corruption. [New Nation, 1999]
Still heavily dependent on foreign aid after twenty-eight years of independence, the country got a rude awakening by a World Bank review issued by the country director Frederick Temple. He conveyed to the government of Bangladesh the dismay and discomfort the current situation in Bangladesh is causing to the donors. Representing the donors' view, he drew a very pessimistic picture of the country's overall situation and described the macroeconomic situation of the country as "fragile." This is being considered a sobering report card on Bangladesh, saying economic growth is too slow to defeat poverty and that it is handicapped by political unrest, slackening reform and environmental crisis. [Ahmed, 1999]
Within the last few decades, several Asian countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, experienced significant development. They are the newly industrialized countries. Why didn't or doesn't it happen in the case of Bangladesh? In some regard, Bangladesh shares many common characteristics with other fellow actors in the drama, especially Pakistan and India. Most of these similarities are in the negative areas. At the same time, there are many dissimilarities with the fellow actors in the drama, but those seem to be the aspects in which the fellow actors are faring somewhat better than Bangladesh. So, what happened to Bangladesh and why? Let's examine that question in the perspective of Asian Drama.
III. The Asian Drama Perspective and Framework
The identity of Bangladesh as a new actor in the drama was subsumed in the entity of Pakistan in Asian Drama. Among the countries Myrdal separately dealt with in Asian Drama, Pakistan and India received particular attention. Thus, as far as Bangladesh is concerned, to understand its development or underdevelopment in the context of Asian Drama, we have to turn to Myrdal's analysis of South Asia, in general, and Pakistan, in particular.
Myrdal was against the "opportunistic interests" behind "diplomacy by terminology." [Streeten, p. 542] For example, the expressions such as "developing countries" was an euphemism to him, masking the "ideological and biased" contents. As Streeten explains Myrdals view, using an example from Amartya Sen: "Take the term 'developing economy,' which refers to countries that are lacking in development, whether or not they are actually 'developing' in any understandable sense. The usage clearly does confound the need for development with its occurrence - it is like defining a hungry person as 'eating'." Indeed, the way Myrdal defined and articulated his theoretical and methodological edifice to explain development in Asian Drama, one can argue that in countries like Bangladesh, development is not occurring - it's simply absent. Even though the developed countries adopted such euphemism due to the reservations of the underdeveloped countries regarding the characterization as underdeveloped, Myrdal thought that such twisted terminologies masked a bias in the direction of overoptimism and evasion of the hard measures that are needed. [Streeten, p. 542]
Myrdal’s approach to development was not merely from the economic perspective as he viewed each country or economy as a "social system" that "consists of a great number of conditions that are causally interrelated …." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 1859-60] In this social system with causally interdependent variables, Myrdal identified six broad categories of "conditions": (1) output and incomes; (2) conditions of production; (3) levels of living; (4) attitudes toward life and work; (5) institutions; and (6) policies. [Myrdal, 1968, p. 1860]
Myrdal identified the first three as "broadly what is usually referred to as the ‘economic factors’, 4-5 as non-economic factors, and the last as mixed. The significance of his perspective and framework is that he dealt with the development problems as something related to a "social system" and he viewed himself not merely as an economist, but as a social scientist. "In the social system there, …, no up and down, no primary or secondary, and economic conditions do not have a precedence over the others." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 1860] However, "[I]n general, the causal connections between the conditions in the first three [economic] categories depend on the conditions in the ‘non-economic’ categories 4 and 5." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 1863].
To better understand this point of view, one needs to look at one of the most important ideas contributed by Myrdal, Circular or Cumulative Causation. While Streeten [p. 544] argues that Circular and Cumulative Causation are not synonymous, which may have been a confusion on Myrdal's part, there is another terminology used parallel to Circular or Cumulative Causation - vicious vs. virtuous circle - that might be especially relevant. Indeed, ignoring Streeten's point about Myrdal's possible confusion about Circular and Cumulative Causation, it can be argued that from Myrdal's analytical perspective, development coincides with the phase when a country is on the path of its virtuous circle or at least it has made a break, away from its vicious circle. Another word, a country might not be called developing, when it is still in its vicious circle.
Myrdal identified a number of criteria (ideals) of development performance as well as their indicators. In Table I [in the Appendix], it is summarized based on the work of Angressao [p. 13]. The first two columns are reproduced from Angressao. The last column contains my evaluation on the basis of those criteria and indicators, whether the development experience of Bangladesh falls in the vicious or virtuous circle. My crude and subjective assessment is that in every single criterion Bangladesh is still on the trajectory of its vicious circle. According to Myrdal, "the movement of the whole social system upwards is what all of us in fact mean by development." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 1868] And, based on this definition and analysis of Myrdal, I grade the development experience of Bangladesh in each category, where A would be the highest grade and F the lowest - failing - grade. In my assessment, except one or two, the grade assigned to Bangladesh's development performance is F.2
What explains this miserable performance? To explain this we turn especially to Myrdal's analysis of Pakistan's experience, of which Bangladesh was a part before 1971. Myrdal's analytical foundation of development rests on a set of modernization ideals that "are mainly the ideology of the politically alert, articulate, and active part of the population - particularly the intellectual elite. ... In abstract form the modernization ideals making up the official creed in those countries have been given expression to an extraordinary degree. .. [M]any of these ideals overlap and, indeed, that they are regularly interdependent and mutually reinforcing, though occasionally conflicting." [Myrdal, 1968, pp. 54-57]
The modernization ideals reflect the value premises that the actors in the drama have chosen for themselves with particular influence of the modern West. The modernization ideals schema Myrdal identified consists of the following: (a) Rationality; (b) Development and Planning for Development; (c) Rise of Productivity; (d) Rise of Levels of Living (with some tolerance of widening inequality); (e) Social and Economic Equalization; (f) Improved Institutions and Attitudes (which include efficiency, diligence, orderliness, punctuality, frugality, scrupulous honesty, rationality in decisions on action, preparedness for change, alertness to opportunities as they arise in a changing world, energetic enterprise, integrity and self-reliance, cooperativeness, and willingness to take the long view); and (g) National Consolidation.
Elaborating on the primary importance of the non-economic factors of development, Myrdal argues, "[T]he change in values and institutions (religious and social taboos, ethnic discrimination and caste systems) constitutes the decisive factor since this is the crucial underpinning of structural socio-economic inequality and of the excessive concentration of income." [Ethier, p. 84] Myrdal critically examines all the major religions of the subcontinent, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, and identifies those areas of each of the religions that are consistent with the modernization ideals and those that are not.
After identifying the modernization ideals Myrdal sets out to examine each of the eight countries of South and Southeast Asia to assess how each country has fared to date (at the time of the study in 1968) and the future prognosis. In this paper, our focus is on Pakistan as the former entity in which Bangladesh was subsumed. Myrdal's discussion of Pakistan is in the context of the partition of British India, and thus in comparison to India's experience as well.
IV. Pakistan in the Asian Drama and the Bangladesh Parallel
There are several aspects in Myrdal's analysis of Pakistan in light of which he explains why Pakistan has not been that successful in its development aspirations, and most of these aspects have tremendous parallel to Bangladesh.
a. The lack of national purpose.
One of the most striking observations of Myrdal in regard to Pakistan is at the outset of his discussion on the chapter on Pakistan identifying "the lack of national purpose." He comments: "[F]ew modern states started their independent existence on such a tenuous basis and under such severe initial difficulties as Pakistan." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 305] Such a view of statement might elicit quick reaction that their was a purpose: to embody an Islamic vision.
Myrdal recognizes the existence of such a purpose, but goes at great length explaining why it was so vacuous. "Behind the unfavorable circumstances of its origin was a fundamental predicament - the lack of a clear conception of the kind of state that should be created and the aims it should pursue. The struggle for Pakistan was exclusively concerned with freeing Moslems from Hindu domination." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 306]. One can simply substitute Bangladesh for Pakistan in the above statement, and it would be equally valid. The statement with such substitution would read like this: "Behind the unfavorable circumstances of its origin was a fundamental predicament - the lack of a clear conception of the kind of state that should be created and the aims it should pursue. The struggle for Bangladesh was exclusively concerned with freeing East Pakistanis or East Bengalis from West Pakistani domination."
Although in case of Pakistan Islam was used to justify the two nation theory in favor of a separate nation for the Muslims, and in case of Bangladesh, no specific ideology was in the background of Independence struggle of Bangladesh, clearly there was a fundamental lacking: vision and planning.
Even cursorily, it is worth noting that Myrdal had very high regard for Islam. He writes very highly about Islam and its compatibility with the modernization ideals, and at the same time he recognized the cultural distortions of Islam as a received legacy at the popular level.2 This is important in the context of Bangladesh because it is a Muslim majority country. Whether one views the role of religion in development and transformation of a society positively or negatively, it is undeniable that religion at the popular level has a deep and strong hold on the mass.
b. Lack of pre-independence planning
"The campaign for Pakistan ... left confusion about the aims and policies to be pursued by the new state. ... [T]he Muslim League in pre-independence times was so locked in the fight for partition that it never developed a social and economic program as did the Indian Congress. What the new state should do for its citizens - other than free them from Hindu domination - was left vague and uncertain. The political inclinations of most of the leaders of the League were probably similar to those of British conservatives a few generations ago; they wanted the new state to be secular and in some sense modern, not only in its formal political institutions; it should even be progressive, provided their privileged position was not jeopardized." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 308]
While there were the 6, 7, and 11 resolutions as part of the pre-independence political campaign in East Pakistan, none of those sets of resolution amounted to a vision that had any bearing on the independent Bangladesh, partly because those resolutions where designed for seeking autonomy, not independence. Although some still argue, with some validity, that the campaign for autonomy was merely a disguise for pushing the country to the brink of separation, which still won’t justify any of the acts the Pakistani regimes perpetrated, facilitating the environment and mood for complete independence.
Similar to the experience of Pakistan, where the privileged class of the pre-independence period vigorously sought, fought for and succeeded in preserving and enhancing their privileges, the case of Bangladesh was no different. Although the privileged class under Awami League was not primarily the big landlords, as it was in Pakistan [Myrdal, 1968, p. 234-235], the essential similarity lies in the motivation and campaign of the "privileged" class, whatever its composition or nature is, to preserve its reign.
c. The initial difficulty
Recognizing the importance of the initial difficulty faced by Pakistan, Myrdal commented: "Born in communal strife and political and economic chaos and bordered by hostile neighbors, the country’s mere survival as a political unit was remarkable." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 305]. Among the aspects of initial difficulty, he included (a) the separation of the two wings of the country thousand miles apart with a hostile country in between; relatively less natural resources compared to India; inherited hardly any main offices of major firms, banks, or industry; and inherited fewer administrators, clerks, professional and business people, and skilled workers than India. [Myrdal, 1968, p. 305]
The "initial difficulty" in case of Bangladesh as it gained independence in 1971 was probably more difficult than what Pakistan experienced in 1947. Bangladesh had to endure one of the worst genocides and widespread and systematic devastation of resources by Pakistan on one hand and expropriation of significant resources in the form of booty by India. Just like Pakistan inherited a disproportionately smaller share of the resources at independence compared to its counterpart in India, the same was the experience of Bangladesh, relative to Pakistan, when Bangladesh parted with Pakistan. Yet, quite similarly, Myrdal’s statement about the survival of Pakistan can be applied to Bangladesh too, because if the survival of Pakistan was "remarkable", given the greater initial difficulty, the survival of Bangladesh was probably only more so.
d. Lack of democratic leadership
In light of the modernization goals, as stated and embraced publicly by Pakistani leaders, democracy was to be the political norm. "As in the other liberated countries of South Asia, it was commonly agreed that Pakistan should be a democratic state in which fundamental rights and social justice were guaranteed to all and power resided with the governed." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 312] However, from Muhammad Ali Jinnah to Liaquat Ali Khan "[T]hey had no serious commitment to democracy or belief in politics as a means of producing social and economic change." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 312]
Myrdal especially emphasized the point that as a part of pre-Independence vision, Indian leadership had a commitment to build a democratic tradition, unlike the Pakistani leadership. Even throughout the independence movement, Indian leadership fostered a more populist form of culture, rather than authoritarian leadership. Myrdal also makes a point as to how the charisma of Jinnah was such that neither he liked to be challenged, nor did anyone dare to. Those around him elevated him to "Quaid-e-Azam" (great leader) compared to a more down-to-earth title for Gandhi, the Mahatma (great souled), or to the ordinary people, Bapuji.
"[W]ithin the Indian National Congress the fundamental principle of government by discussion, with its correlatives of cooperation and discipline, had been established. Pakistan had far fewer leaders of similar caliber and less of a tradition of discussion among them. Jinnah not only became the permanent President of the Muslim League; he converted his position into a virtual dictatorship. ... In India the Congress kept together after independence and preserved its popular following and, particularly in the beginning, a remarkable degree of centralized direction. It thus remained an effective political machine. ... This had given the stability to government in India that Pakistan has not enjoyed." [Myrdal, 1968, pp. 246-247]
The legacy that Pakistan developed in the post-independence found a posterior parallel in Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had such charisma and mandate from the people that the way he acted within his political party, Awami League, and in dealing with the political institutions of the country, within a few years the country was going toward a one-party political system with all other parties banned. Similar to the case of pre-independence Muslim League, there was no democratic culture nurtured within Awami League, the result of which was inevitable in the post-independence Bangladesh, quite parallel to the experience of post-independence Pakistan. None of the other subsequent leaders in Bangladesh has made a genuine effort to restore the democratic culture that is so badly needed, or desired by the modernization ideals.
e. National consolidation and emotional integration
For any kind of development a reasonable level of political and social stability and cohesion is a must. Myrdal's perspective on this is contained in two different expressions: national consolidation and emotional integration. In regard to those who articulate the modernization ideals in the Asian Drama, in his view, "harbor within themselves sharply conflicting valuations. ... In Western countries such differences also exist, but through a long process of national consolidation, or of what in India is called 'emotional integration,' these differences have tended to diminish. The modern democratic welfare states developed in the West during the past half century have a high degree of 'created harmony' of interests and ideals." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 53]
In evaluating the experience of Pakistan in terms of national consolidation, writing more than twenty years after the independence and two years before partition, Myrdal wrote: "Any government in Pakistan that tries to engender national consolidation and development must cope with certain basic difficulties. It is a very poor country without a history of political identity or national allegiance. Its population is divided by widespread social and economic inequalities and its solidarity further strained by a geographical division into two roughly equal units whose principal tie is a common religion and a shared animosity to the large neighbor that separates them. Clearly, religion and resentment against a neighboring state are precarious foundations on which to build a modern state." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 338]
Myrdal, quite empathetically, discusses the issue of indigenous languages and even the specific case of the Language Movement in East Pakistan. "No real 'emotional integration' of the new nations and therefore no secure national consolidation is possible as long as the members of the tiny upper class in charge of administration, law enforcement, and modernized business and industry communicate in a European language and the masses speak only their native tongue. ... On rational grounds, therefore, increased use of the indigenous language must be part of the planning in all South Asian countries, both in the conduct of ordinary affairs and in businesses, governmental bodies, and, of course, schools and universities." [Myrdal, 1968, pp. 81-82]
Pakistan went far beyond just a failure to recognize such needs. During the earliest days of Pakistan, there was a deliberate effort to impose a language on the majority of the country as a national language. The seed of emotional rift that was sowed by the leaders of Muslim League only inevitably grew with no genuine effort toward 'emotional integration.' Rather, economic as well all other policies in Pakistan were basically discriminatory particularly toward East Pakistan, where the majority of the country resided.
What is the Bangladesh experience? Well, almost business as usual. If Pakistan had a tenuous national purpose, the case of Bangladesh was no better. The hatred for Pakistanis, howevermuch justified in light of the two decades' experience as one nation, has not proven to be a sufficient foundation for a better future in light of the post-independence experience of Bangladesh.
The country is falling apart from inside due to a serious lack of emotional integration both at the domestic as well as the regional level. The trauma of India-Pakistan separation after the British left has not healed and no genuine effort has been made from either side in that direction since 1947. The post-independence experience of Pakistan has not been toward an emotional integration. The most tragic fact about that is the way Bangladesh had to seek its independence in 1971. Even after 1971, Pakistan's emotional integration is not in the positive direction: those who migrated to Pakistan from India and those who are "originally" from Pakistan are still killing each other. The post-independence direction of Bangladesh is not much different.
One of the most important rifts serving as a stumbling block toward emotional integration and national consolidation is indicated by the fact that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Independence movement and the subsequent PM of Bangladesh, was brutally assassinated along with most of his family members. The ruling party, the same party of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is now at loggerhead with combined opposition, which has brought the country to a dead-end. Some observers even mention about a potential civil war.
Myrdal attributes relative success of India, as compared to Pakistan, in regard to institutionalization of democracy to the leadership of India in developing a better political culture traceable even during the pre-independence period.
Pakistan's case was different as we have already explained above. Due to the authoritarian culture of the leadership during pre-independence as well as post-independence period, the country is yet to see any genuine transition toward a stable and functional democracy. The last few "elected" regimes under Benajir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and their internecine politics resulted into reassertion and reemergence of the military rule.
The political culture and experience of Bangladesh are similar. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and General Zia were assassinated, General Ershad was overthrown and then thrown into jail, Khaleda Zia's elected government was brought down by the united movement of the opposition, and now the government of Sheikh Hasina is facing the tit from the combined opposition for the earlier tat. The people some time get tired of such farcical democracy as it seems that the common people of Pakistan are not that much bothered about the return of the military rule.
Reflecting on the nature and the conduct of opposition parties, whoever they may be at different times - call it the opposition culture - Myrdal wrote: "Even the most devoted friend of political democracy cannot see much hope for national consolidation and development in the fight being waged in the name of democracy by the present opposition parties." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 341]
The above sentence is equally valid in case of Bangladesh the way Awami League acted earlier as an opposition party to bring down Khaleda Zia's government, and the way now Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in alliance with other parties, some of which were with Awami League in the previous round, is now acting against the ruling Awami League regime.
As Myrdal pointed out that the call for freedom from domination of the British and the Hindu could incite one group against the other, but "its positive value in creating national identity and purpose was to prove rather illusory" in Pakistan in post-1947 period. The case of Bangladesh, seeking freedom from the domination of the Pakistanis also, so far, has proved illusory "in creating national identity and purpose" conducive for a true development and transformation.
Interestingly, Myrdal was not very convinced that democracy has a bright future in Pakistan, given its past authoritarian history and culture. More importantly, he did not feel that, generally speaking, western-type democracy was a precondition toward development. Based on his analysis, he saw, in a somewhat paradoxical fashion, "the elites rather than the masses are the instruments of social change in the context of a paternalistic and authoritarian political structure" [Chossudovsky, p. 106]. Probably giving some credence to the notion of "enlightened despotism", he wrote: "[I]t may be doubted whether this ideal of political democracy - with political power based on free elections and with freedom of assembly, press, and other civil liberties - should be given weight in formulating the modernization ideals. ... [E]xperience has shown that, unlike other value premises, this ideal is not essential to a system comprising all the other modernization ideals. National independence, national consolidation, changes in institutions and attitudes, equalization, rise of productivity, rise and redirection of consumption, and more generally, planning for development can be attained by an authoritarian regime bent on their realization. On the other hand, the substitution of an authoritarian regime for a more democratic one gives no assurance that policies will be directed toward the realization of those ideals, or that, if so directed, they will be more effective." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 65]
Those enamored with modernization ideals might not quite agree with Myrdal's viewpoint as articulated above, but that is not probably because Myrdal is incorrect, but because at least the semblance of democracy is indispensable in modern times. Thus, even the military juntas who come to power through backdoors, the first thing they have to proclaim is their deep faith in democracy.
Somewhat sympathetically, Myrdal refers to Ayub Khan's comment about the failed politicians: "[T]hey were given a system of government totally unsuited to the temper and climate of the country." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 324] Myrdal's own remark in regard to the Ayub Khan's regime was even more revealing: "Thus what hope there is for progress in Pakistan must be attached to the present quasi-dictatorial regime: to its ability, despite its very narrow class basis, to advance national goals of planning, equality, and consolidation and to purse the state of corruption." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 341] The ghost of Ayub Khan returns as General Musharraf in Pakistan, once again, reinforcing Myrdal's point.
Is the experience of Bangladesh, especially the dysfunctional democracy, another confirmation of Myrdal's prognosis that the politicians of Bangladesh too are incompatible to a culture of functional democracy? Pakistan seems to have vindicated him, even posthumously. Would the case of Bangladesh be any different?
Conclusion
As enunciated in this paper, in light of Myrdal's Asian Drama, there are certain real non-economic determinants or impediments to economic development that may cause a country to perpetuate in a vicious circle. Myrdal's contribution in the field of economic development had most profound effect as development paradigms have shifted through several phases including basic needs approach and sustainable development. Unfortunately, many of the countries Myrdal chose as actors in his drama probably have not read the drama or have not read as assiduously as Myrdal himself strove to write. Myrdal passed away in 1987 and thus lived nearly two decades after Asian Drama was published. He was greatly disappointed by the general path followed by most of the countries included in Asian Drama. [Ethier, p. 84] Although his script did not include Bangladesh as a separate actor, in most cases, the Bangladesh experience, so far, vindicates Myrdal's analysis.
For a true transformation of any economy, including Pakistan and Bangladesh, addressing the non-economic problems is critical. Although Bangladesh was not dealt with as a separate unit for his analysis, remarkably, as articulated in this paper, the experience of Bangladesh fits quite snugly into Myrdal's analysis as simply a continuation of Pakistan's experience.
Is there any hope? Well, Myrdal was only cautiously optimistic about Pakistan. One can probably extrapolate his thoughts in regard to Bangladesh in a similar line. Whatever conclusions Myrdal drew and opinions expressed were merely results of his most comprehensive analysis of development issues to date. Myrdal's conception of Asian Drama was not like a staged drama with a predetermined end. Thus, there is hope.
Myrdal wrote: "In the classic conception of drama - as in the theoretical phase of a scientific study - the will of the actors was confined in the shackles of determinism. The outcome at the final curtain was predetermined by the opening up of the drama in the first act, accounting for all the conditions and causes of later developments. The protagonist carried his ultimate fate in his soul, while he was groping for his destiny. In life, while the drama is still unfolding - as in the practical phase of a study, when policy inferences are drawn from value premises as well as from premises based on empirical evidence - the will is instead assumed to be free, within limits, to choose between alternative courses of action. History, then, is not taken to be predetermined, but within the power of man to shape. And the drama thus conceived is not necessarily tragedy." [Myrdal, 1968, p. 35]
That is the hope for countries such as Bangladesh. When the conditions, particularly the non-economic ones, would favor for the real national will to express and assert itself with appropriate requisites in letting the drama unfold differently than in a tragic drama, we won't be disproving Myrdal. Rather, it would be another testimony to Myrdal's faith in the power of man (or nation) to shape his (its) future.
Notes:
Bibliography
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Criteria |
Performance indicator |
The case of Bangladesh4 (Cycle; grade: A - highest, F - lowest) |
|
Social and economic equalization Regarding status, opportunities, wealth, income, and levels of living |
Distribution wealth and income | Vicious; C |
|
Rise of productivity
Increased output per capita |
% change in GDP/capita | Vicious; D |
|
Rise of levels of living
Prerequisites for rising efficiency and improved productivity of labor |
Incidence of poverty,
Real wages,
Unemployment, Inflation |
Vicious; D |
|
Improved institutions and attitudes
Want people who are efficient, diligent, orderly, energetic and enterprising, and have a long run outlook. |
Number of new firms developed;
Crime rates; Involvement in social and uncivil economics; Tax avoidance |
Vicious; F |
|
Social discipline, rational planning
Establish coordinated economic policies by procedures based upon sound critical reasoning. Compliance does not require compulsion |
Procedure and basis for democratic development (transformation) policies | Vicious; F |
|
National independence
Effective formation and execution of national policies |
Political stability and ability to legislate | Vicious; F |
|
National consolidation
United, cohesive, and effective national system of government, legal system, and administration with unchallenged authority within boundaries of the state. |
Ability to enforce laws | Vicious; F |
|
Political democracy
National regime viewed as legitimate and accepted by a majority of the public. |
Extent of democracy in willingly political system and public attitude towards governing authorities | Vicious; F |
Source: Angresano, James (1997), The Political Economy of Gunnar Myrdal: The Institutional Basis for the Transformation Problem, UK: Edward Elgar; p. 13.
This paper has been cited in the following works:
William H. Thornton and Songok Han Thornton. "The Price of Alignment: India in the New Asian Drama," Journal of Developing Societies 2006; 22; 401-420.
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