The Issue of FARAKKA:
An Introduction
XII. Bangladesh: Instability, chaos and follies
Yes, India promised that it won't do anything that would harm the lower-Riperian country, Bangladesh. But Bangladesh has been harmed.
Yes, India did build the Barrage without a genuine consultation with its neighbors.
Yes, India UNILATERALLY withdrew water from the Ganges through Farakka.
Yes, India has not treated Bangladesh as an Independent nation.
Yes, Bangladesh has suffered terribly - economically, physically and environmentally - due to water related problems. But it seems that there were windows of opportunities for important breakthrough that could not be seized due to problems from the Indian side AS MUCH AS FROM THE BANGLADESH SIDE. In this part, I would like to focus on those aspects of problems related to Bangladesh side that may have contributed to continued lack of resolution of the problems.
A. Tug of war between the experts and the politicians
I have already dealt with this matter in a different segment. Here, I would like to point out that in both Bangladesh and India political priorities and decision have overridden the technical experts. However, it is not well-known (or, rather I have not come cross the relevant information) as to how much the Indian government has suppressed the opinions of the technical experts, but in case of Bangladesh technical experts have been systematically ignored or their inputs have been suppressed during key points in negotiations.
B. Bangladesh's pursuit of secrecy: Not much different
Earlier I have provided information as to how the key report of the German expert Hensen was suppressed by India (even though it used his report to justify the necessity of Farakka Barrage), the sensitivity to information and research that might spoil the respective countries' position was no less in case of Bangladesh. Dr. Ben Crow sheds some light on such matters from his personal experience.
"As with most international discussions of consequence, there are pressures in these discussions for secrecy and the control of information. Data and documents are routinely classified and sometimes suppressed. Press releases and statement are influenced by the tactical needs of one side at a particular moment. These tendencies favouring secrecy and the manipulation of information are redoubled when, as in this case, the issues under discussion come to reflect national goals and national identities. In the case of this conflict, INDEPENDENT RESEARCH IS MONITORED AND SOMETIMES DISCOURAGED. An account of what happened in the discussions then has to peer behind a veil of secrecy, misinformation and partisan perceptions [ p. 11]
... In Calcutta, police authorities questioned one of our informants. In Dhaka, the police Special Branch staged a dramatic raid, involving truck and jeep loads of solders, to arrest the author. Three days of interviews followed. Charges were not pressed. A US graduate student researching the conflict for a Ph.D. was expelled from Bangladesh. Academic papers on the topic by Indian scholars are sometimes withdrawn from international conferences at the last moment, reportedly at the government's request. [Note #4 to the Preface, p. 240]By the way, I found the book of Ben Crow is among the most balanced and insightful one that provides foundation for pursuing a positive future for these contending nations. This might be one
book about Farakka issue that everyone should read.C. Political instability and uncertainty in Bangladesh
In such a complicated matter of dispute, Bangladesh suffered greatly due to:
(a) domestic political instability,
(b) dysfunctional system of decision-making, and
(c) lack of governments with popular mandates.
Farakka issue stood in the face of Bangladesh as India completed its construction - waiting to commission it - and Bangladesh, as the party that was critically "delivered" during its liberation struggle in 1971, had been under constant pressure from India. Beyond the issue of Farakka, India has tried to shift the discussion to apportionment of the Ganges' water and augmentation of water through some additional plan and constructions. "It follows that complications in the Ganga water dispute, to a great extent, are the outcome of the diplomatic moves on the part of the Indian policy-makers. A temporary basis of the sharing of the Ganga means the possibility of a vacuum after the lapse of a certain period. As the vacuum is detrimental to the interest of Bangladesh, India gets a position to put pressure on Bangladesh to agree to its proposal of augmentation of the Ganga and which is the the Ganga-Brahmaputra link canal. " [Begum, p. 124]
However, in dealing with such a formidable and unequal partner and neighbor, Bangladesh definitely needed cohesive and synergistic thought, approach and stance. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Unlike India, where democracy has been institutionalized since its independence, Bangladesh continues on its slippery slope of dysfunctional governance. We have not achieved a REASONABLE or MINIMUM level of cohesion or functionality as a nation to meaningfully deal with such important matters.
D. Political use of the Farakka issue
Bangladesh, though generally and fundamentally a victim as far as Farakka and water-related issues are concerned, has not been quite "Tulshi dhoa".Farakka, of course, has not been merely a political issue for Bangladesh. Rather, a matter of life and death. However, parallel to dealing with this vital issue of national interest, various regimes of questionable constitutional and popular legitimacy have tried to USE this issue (among a few) to keep their post-Mujib, anti-Indian sentiment aflame. As the political landscape of Bangladesh fundamentally changed from "grateful" INdia-dependent condition to less than "grateful", independent stance, political leaders have found the Farakka issue convenient for their domestic political mileage as well. While keeping the issue alive and in full burner is important to mobilize and maintain public opinion, it also served well to unrealistically stiffen and worsen anti-Indian stance and rhetoric, creating further distance between the two sides. It is important to realize that differences at the level of political leadership is one thing, deeper and deepening gap between the people of the two countries are something quite different.
E. Lost opportunities due to political dysfunctionality
During the post-Mujib period of instability of few years, Bangladesh had an approach and ideas about dealing with the Farakka issue that Ben Crow identifies in his book Sharing the Ganges as the "old line".
"Since 1974, both governments had been committed to the view that the short-term problem of sharing the Ganges could be solved by the implementation of a long-term approach to the augmentation of the river's dry season flow. On that both sides were agreed: augmentation offered the solution to the shortage of water during the dry season. The two sides disagree, however, about the manner of augmentation. Since 1978, the two governments have been committed to MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE proposals for augmentation. Bangladesh wanted the solution to be found within the basin of the Ganges by building reservoirs in the river's headwaters, primarily in Nepal. India wanted to meet the shortage in the Ganges by transferring water from the Brahmaputra. The NEW approach on the Bangladesh side broke with their previous overall conception of the problem and their previous technical proposals.The new line separate the questions of augmentation and sharing and reconsidered alteranative engineering approaches to the low dry season flows. Two aspects of the new approach deserve consideration: diplomatic assessments and political factors which favoured the new approach, and criticisms of technical aspects of the old line together with a deepening understanding of new engineering possibilities." [Crow, p. 188]
Ben Crow traces the rise and fall of the new line during early 80's. "The opportunity to establish one part of the new line in an agreement between the two governments had passed by the end of the year, and during 1984 the government of Bangladesh returned to public statements of the old line. Obaidullah Khan resigned from his post rather than join the President's civilianisation of the government. He was replaced by Air Vice Marshal Aminul Islam, who, in the words of a Bangladesh member of the Joint Rivers Commission, 'went back to the old approach of FIGHTING with India'." [p. 198]
Ben Crow identifies other opportunities and potential breakthroughs in India-Bangladesh relationship, especially in the context of Farakka and water-related issues. "On at least two occasions, the principal negotiators believe they came close to agreement. ... In neither of the two opportunities did the Bangladesh minister promoting the new line succeed in gaining support for his proposal. But Obaidullah Khan and Anisul Islam Mahmud thought they had the support of the President, but when it came to wider discussions, they did not carry the cabinet. Obaidullah Khan found his proposals blocked in part by the perception of key generals that the proposals played into the hands of the Indian government. Similarly, in 1987, Anisul Islam Mahmud failed to carry the cabinet even to the point of gaining a full hearing for the new line." [pp. 214-215]
"An" agreement, claimed as a comprehensive and just one, had to wait until Awami League would return to power to revive the old day's "grateful" approach, and secure "an(y)" agreement that would allow the party to claim it had achieved what could not be possible by other governments before and India could claim that the matters have been settled due to their gracious concessions and much to their disadvantage. This is despite the fact that real situation with water-sharing for Bangladesh has not really that much changed, and Bangladesh's dispute about Farakka is far from over.
Go to Part XIII: more to follow.
Go to the Farakka Index
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