Held on 9-10 April under Jinnah's chairmanship, the convention of Muslim councillors, although ostensibly sitting to decide on the Muslim quota in the interim central government, changed the content of the Lahore Resolution, which had demanded the creation of two sovereign Muslim states. The General Secretary of the Muslim League, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, at Jinnah's instance, corrected the word "states" for state as a typo- graphical error, ignoring loud protestations from Bengali councillors, the most vocal of whom. were Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashahi, President of the Assam Provincial Muslim League, and Abul Hashim, General Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League.¹⁰⁷

Bengal questioned the right of the Convention of Councillors to change the decision of a resolution that had been adopted by a full body of Muslim representatives, but Jinnah was adamant for one Pakistan, when he saw his dream within sight. Evidently, he ignored the geographical incongruity and the basic differences between the two peoples and their ways of life: Urdu was the lingua franca of the Muslims of the provinces west of Bengal, while Bengali Muslims, who alone maintained their separate identity, spoke and read in Bengali. They also differed in their respective traditions, social systems, food and dress. The only common bond was religion and even though this may have been a good enough reason to fight for freedom from a common enemy it certainly was not a good enough reason to live together as one nation. Furthermore, the struggle for Muslim emancipation that originated in Bengal was not fought on religious grounds alone; economic emancipation from the more advanced and affluent Hindus, the Hindu zamindars (landlords) and mahajans (money-lenders), was much more important to them.¹⁰⁸ But, for the Muslims of western India, religious considerations were as, if not more, important as the economic factor.

Why Suhrawardy, who had never wanted a partitioned Bengal, agreed to this change, has puzzled many people to this day. We should not, however, forget that the 1946 Resolution was the end-product of the existing political circumstances, created by the passing of the Lahore-termed "Pakistan" Resolution in 1940 and the holding of the 1946 general election on the issue of Pakistan. The demand for the two sovereign Muslim states was as quickly forgotten as the people of Bengal forgot Fazlul Huq, when they discovered that their greater demand for freedom from Hindu domination became threatened by the Congress demand for Akhanda Bharat (undivided India). The failure of the three other Muslim majority provinces to return a Muslim League government had already weakened Jinnah's arguments for Pakistan. Suhrawardy was astute enough to realize that Pakistan would never be created in the foreseeable future if Bengal stood firm on its stand of a separate sovereign state and would play straight into the bands of the Congress As Prime Minister of the only Muslim League government in the subcontinent much depended on him and be acted as an all-India nationalist Muslim leader to firstly create the state of Pakistan but did not, at the same time, withdraw the principle of a separate sovereign state in eastern India Thus, on the day the resolution was moved, he suggested in his confidential note to the Cabinet delegation that "the British would find it to their advantage to deal with two or three, or more central authorities than one."¹⁰⁹

In moving the Resolution Suhrawardy declared that in this sub-continent there was no path for Muslims other than the Muslim League and no ambition before them other than Pakistan (appendix III),¹¹⁰ He observed "Britain wants to hand over power to the Indians and the Cabinet Mission is here to find out suitable machinery for the transfer of power Congress tells the British 'Give us power, we shall sweep away all opposition We shall suppress the Muslims We shall bring the scheduled caste to heel and we shall annihilate the adivasis Give us the police, your army and arms and we shall reproduce an armageddon in the name of a united India.' This I call insanity induced by the lust for power We do not intend to start a civil war but we want a land where we can live in peace We are a nation and, we believe, we have something to contribute to the civilization of the world But are the British and the Congress prepared to give us Pakistan peacefully and with grace? If not, then, are the Muslims prepared to fight? I have long pondered over these questions Let me now honestly declare that every Muslim of Bengal is ready and prepared to lay down his life for Pakistan Now I call upon you, Mr. Jinnah, to test us.'¹¹¹

Direct Action Day.  At this time, betraying the Muslim cause, the Viceroy called upon Pandit Nehru to form an interim government which he did, but the Muslim League refused to participate in it Jinnah even cancelled his talks with Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, and proclaimed 16 August as Direct Action Day.¹¹² The one-member majority Muslim League government in Sind, formed after the assassination of the Congress Chief minister Allahbux, was also asked, but, because it was a shaky government, its Muslim League members could not be trusted. So, all the risks of the Direct Action Day fell on the Bengal government On that day Muslims were expected to gather in large numbers to proclaim their adherence to the concept of Pakistan Shaheed Suhrawardy declared a holiday for that day in Calcutta

On a previous occasion, when no holiday had been proclaimed, there had been disturbances between Hindus and Muslims; people were dragged out of their cars and insulted. Now Hindus objected to the proclamation of a holiday and made extensive, secret preparations to attack Muslims. Neither the Intelligence Branch concerned with the activities of terrorists and revolutionaries, nor the Criminal Investigation Department, both of which were manned almost wholly by Hindus. gave the Prime Minister any information regarding these preparations and he was caught unawares.¹¹³ On 16 August at the Ochterlony Monument Maidan, whilst he was addressing a crowd, gathered from all parts of Calcutta and the suburbs, he received news that processions were being obstructed and attacked by the Hindus and anti-Muslim riots were taking place in many areas. It was the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (fasting). Suhrawardy ordered the Muslims to disperse and go back to their homes. The crowd was very large, many with children in their laps, having come from all over the city, from the neighbouring areas of Howrah and the 24-Parganas, and from the Jute and Cotton Mill areas. As the crowd was returning home they were set upon by the Hindus, provoking an anti-Muslim riot on a scale far greater than the one in 1926.

The Commissioner of Police, a Britisher, did not know Calcutta and its problems and was unable to deal with the situation with only a small police force. The Riot Commission, which was set up by the British government as a result of the riot, reports that immediately after the riot began the Prime Minister rushed to Lalbazar Police Headquarters to attain first hand information and, being apprised of the grave situation, demanded deployment of the army on the very first day of the riot.¹¹⁴ But Governor Burrows rejected the demand, primarily to divert the strong anti-British sentiments, generated during the Rashid Ali Day, observed in Calcutta in June 1945 and which he hoped would worsen Hindu-Muslim relations.¹¹⁵ Captain Ali was a member of the Indian National Army, which had been created by Subash Chandra Bose to fight the British during the Second World War. He was caught, tried and sentenced to a seven-year jail term. Captain Ali had sought Muslim League support during his trial and Suhrawardy, defying a government ban, headed a large protest procession, along with other top League and Congress leaders.¹¹⁶

The Governor also turned down Suhrawardy's suggestion to put pickets between Hindu and Muslim localities, creating a bulwark which would help to separate the two communities (a suggestion adopted much later, when the damage had already been done and a number of Muslim localities had been destroyed and thousands of Muslims massacred). Instead, Burrows heeded the advice of the Commissioner of Police that the civil power was capable of dealing with the situation and that there was no need to deploy the army. It was only when Suhrawardy threatened to resign that the Governor reluctantly pretended to agree and three or four days later merely ordered the army to stand by.  Suhrawardy, accompanying the Governor and the army commander on a tour of inspection on 18 August, showed them an area of Calcutta, Suvabazaar , which was strewn with the bodies of dead Muslims. This was predominantly a Hindu area, with some Muslim houses and shops. The army had had no knowledge that this was a riot area and the Commissioner of Police, himself, had had no information that there had been riots there. It was a "big discovery" of "wholesale slaughter" of Muslims and the Governor and the General were deeply shocked.¹¹⁷

Appointment of Punjabi police. At that time Calcutta was a city of 6 million people but it had only a 1200-man police force of whom, only 63 were Muslims.¹¹⁸ Of the officers, with the exception of one Deputy Commissioner and one Officer-in-Charge, the remainder were Hindus.¹¹⁹ The riot had spread so far that even government officials were not beyond direct involvement. The 1200-man police force was, therefore, not only too small to cope with the situation but suspect in its loyalty as well. In this situation Suhrawardy decided to appoint 1,200 trained Muslim Punjabi Sepahis to achieve equity in the balance of the city's police force.¹²⁰ Hindu leaders protested against this to the Governor, who asked Suhrawardy to desist from recruiting Muslim Punjabi Sepahis. Instead, he suggested recruitment of the same number of trained Muslim Bengali Sepahis. Suhrawardy argued that trained Muslim Bengali Sepahis could not easily be found and that he needed trained forces immediately to contain the riots. He also argued that the police force of Calcutta was composed of Gurkhas, Sikhs, Rajputs and Jats, and there was no Hindu Bengali. He agreed to appoint an equal number of Muslim and Hindu Bengalis only after dismissing the existing force. However, the Governor did not agree to this proposal and urged him not to appoint trained Muslim Punjabi Sepahis. Burrows finally consented to his proposal only when the Prime Minister again threatened to resign on this issue.¹²¹ Suhrawardy immediately recruited 1,200 trained Muslim Punjabi Sepahis to keep a balance in the police force and ordered Muslim Officers-in-Charge to be posted in 21 of the 22 thanas. He personally took charge of the Police Control Room from one British Officer and mobilized the police force himself to quell the riots.

There were hundreds of occasions when Suhrawardy himself, often clandestinely clad in the uniform of a European military officer, drove through the affected localities to save the lives of the defenceless victims, Muslims and Hindus alike. Suhrawardy's critic, Hassan Ispahani, while giving a pen-picture of this carnage, praises his role in bringing the riot under control. He says: "I have not seen a man work so hard and act so swiftly to try and control a conflagration as Suhrawardy did."¹²² During the riots he arranged free lodging and food for many Hindu families, including ninety-five Hindustani milkmen, his own Hindu haircutter Nogen Sheel and Hindu washerman Kunja Dhopa.¹²³ Among Suhrawardy's trusted personal attendants was Shibu, also a Hindu from Orissa, who served him most faithfully even during those troubled years. Peace soon returned to the riot-torn city.

Peace emissary. The riots perturbed the British government. Viceroy Lord Wavell visited Calcutta on 25 August and saw the carnage himself.¹²⁴ The Muslim community of Calcutta covered the city with thousands of posters, symbolically written in red ink, charging him with the responsibility for the riot and calling upon him to leave.¹²⁵ Dhaka received him with the same slogans. The Viceroy wanted to know from Prime Minister Suhrawardy how he could be held responsible for the riot.¹²⁶ Suhrawardy explained that the riot was a consequence of the formation of the interim government without Muslim League representation and the deeply-held Muslim belief of a deliberate British creation of Hindu-Muslim misunderstanding as a rationale to hand over power only to the Congress Party.¹²⁷ He further warned that what had happened in Calcutta would repeat itself all over India unless the British government changed its policy. Suhrawardy also convinced him that a united India was impossible and cooperation of the Muslim League was essential if India was to be saved from civil war. Before he left Bengal, Lord Wavell asked Suhrawardy to work as an emissary between himself and Jinnah.¹²⁸

Suhrawardy saw Jinnah in Bombay on 6 September and Lord Wavell in Delhi two days later, and succeeded in bringing about a rapprochement between them. They first met on 16 September in Delhi. Lord Wavell assured Jinnah that he was ready to accept the Muslim League demand, and the Muslim League announced on 15 October its decision to join the interim government headed by Pandit Nehru.¹²⁹ On this occasion Jinnah admitted that Suhrawardy had saved the country from a perilous situation.¹³⁰

Notes:

107. Personal communication with the Suhrawardy family. Also see Ahmad^b, K. Socio-political history of Bengal and the birth of Bangladesh (Pioneer Printing Press, 4th ed., Dhaka, 1975), p. 68; Sen, Rangalal, Political Elites of Bangladesh (University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1986), pp. 65-66.

108. Ahmad^b, op. cit., p. 46.

109. Mansergh and Lumby (eds), Constitutional relations between Britain and India: Transfer of power, 1942-47, Vol. VI, London, 1970, p. 196. Quoted in Sen, op.cit., p. 66.

110. Khan, Liaquat Ali, The Resolution of the All-India Muslim League (1945-46), National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan (photostated copy), pp. 35-47. Also see, Ittefaq: Suhrawardy ed., op.cit., pp. 57-58.

111. ibid.

112. The AIML, in its session held in Bombay on 29 July 1946, accepted the Mission Plan and, at the same time, adopted the Direct Action Resolution, saying: "It calls upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole organization--the Muslim League, and be ready for every sacrifice."

113. Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker, GOC of the Eastern Command during the last eighteen months of British rule in India, writes: "Hindu Mahasava was at the root but Hindu Police dominated the Intelligence Branch and the Criminal Investigation Branch of the police who kept the government in darkness." See his book, While memory serves, Cassell and Company Ltd, London, 1950 (Quoted in Ahmad, op. cit., p.72).

114. Hossain^a, op. cit. , pp. 136-137. Tuker corroborates this refusal, saying that "Brigadier Sixsmith gave Mr Suhrawardy the usual reply that the troops best fulfilled their task by keeping open the main routes and increased their effectiveness most economically by throwing out mobile patrols from these main arteries." See his book, While memory serves, op. cit., p. 158.

115. Hossain^,Tofazzal (Manik Mian)^a, Samudrer parimap jamon sambav noy (As the measurement of the sea is impossible), Ittefaq: Suhrawardy edition, March 1964, pp. 136-137, 193.

116. Prominent leaders were Abul Hashim, Sarat Chandra Bose, Surendra Mohan Bose and Kiron Shankar Roy. See ibid,. p. 137.

117. Tuker writes: "Buses and taxis were charging about loaded with Sikhs and Hindus armed with swords, iron bars and fire arms." About the number of deads, Tuker writes: "1 do not know-no one knows-what the casualties were...All one can say is that the toll of dead ran into thousands. " See his book, While memory serves, op. cit., pp. 161,163,165.

118. Hossain, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

119. ibid.

120 ibid.

121. ibid.

122. Ispahani, Hassan, Qaid-e-Azam as I knew him, Forward Publications Trust, Karachi,
Pakistan, 1966, p. 193.

123. Rahman, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

124. Huda, M.N., Suhrawardy-ke jamon dekhecchi (As I saw Suhrawardy), Ittefaq:
Suhrawardy ed., op. cit., p. 158.

125. Ahmad^a , op. cit., pp. 148-149.

126. ibid., p. 149.

127. ibid.

128. Ahsan^a, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Ahmad^a, op. cit., p. 149; Ahmad^b, op. cit., p. 72.

129. In the interim ministry Sri Jogendra Nath Mondal was nominated from Bengal which
was a big farce in the then political situation and shows how apathy and anti-Bengali
were the Muslim League leaders from other provinces, especially Jinnah. Suhrawardy
called this an injustice to Bengal, but Jinnah did it.

130. Ahsan^a, op. cit., p. 21.