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Logic  (Danesh-Name Alai)

Ibn Sina

Introduction by the Translator Autobiographical Note Some Pertinent Excerpts

Introduction Autobiographical Note Excerpts TEXT OF AVICENNA'S TREATISE ON LOGIC PART ONE OF DANESH-NAME ALAI (A CONCISE PHILOSOPHICAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA) Thanks and salutation to God, the creator and bestower of wisdom -salutation to his chosen messenger, Mohamed Mostafa - his family and friends. I received the great order of our master, the just King Ez-Din Ala- Dule Abu- J afar Mohamed ibn Dushmanziar. May his life be long and his fortune increase - the master who provided me with all the objects of my desires such as security, magnanimity - engagement with science and presence in his court - to compose for him and his courtiers a very concise book in Persian (Duri)1 on five traditional and philosophical sciences, namely: First on the science of Logic which is the science of scales (or canon).2 Second on Natural Philosophy which is the science of sensible objects - moving and growing. Third, the science of Astronomy -Cosmology ~ the essence and form and movement of skies and stars, as it is reported and examination of these reports. Fourth, the science of Music and discussion of modes, melodies, harmonies of songs. And the Fifth, Metaphysics, discussion of those things which are outside of Nature. Our plan started with the subject of Logic which is a pure (higher) and formal science and gradually led to less pure and formal sciences (lower), (unlike the prevailing custom). It was possible to start with less formal and lower sciences. Thus I, the servant, though never regarding myself as an expert in this science, obeyed the order of my master hoping that with God's help I could bring it to a successful completion. The Purpose and Use of Logic There are two kinds of cognition: One is called intuitive or perceptive or apprehensive (Tasawor in Arabic). For example, if someone says, 'Man,' or 'Fairy " or' Angel,' or the like, you will [understand, conceive and grasp what he means by the expression. The other kind of cognition is judgment (Tasdiq in Arabic). As for example, when you acknowledge that angels exist or human beings are under surveillance and the like. Cognition can again be analyzed into two kinds. One is the kind that may be known through Intellect; it is known necessarily by reasoning through itself. For example, there are the intuitive cognitions of the whatness of the soul, and judgments about what is grasped by intuitive cognition, such as, the soul is eternal. The other kind of cognition is one that is known by intuition. Judgments about these intuitions, however, are made, not by Intellect, or by reason but by the First Principle. For example, it is known that if two things are equal to the same thing then those things are equal to each other. Then there is the kind of cognition known by the senses, such as, the knowledge that the sun is bright. Also, there is the knowledge that  is received from authority such as those received from sages and prophets. And the kind that is obtained from the general opinion and those we are brought by it, for example, that it is wrong to lie and injustice ought not to be done. And still other kinds -which may be named later. Whatever is known by Intellect, whether it is simple intuitive cognition, or judgment about intuitive cognition, or cognitive judgment, should be based on something which is known prior to the thing, (a posteriori).3 An example of an intuitive or perceptual cognition is this: If we don't know what 'man' means, and someone tells us that man is an animal who talks, we first have to know the meaning of 'animal' and 'talking,' and we must have intuitive cognition of these things before we can learn something we didn't know before about man. An example of a judgment acquired by Intellect is this: If we don't know the meaning of 'the world was created,' and someone tells us that the world possesses color, and whatever possesses color is created; then, and only then, can we know what we didn't know before about the world. Thus, whatever is not known but desired to be known, can be known through what is known before. But it is not the case that whatever is known can be a ground for knowing what is unknown. Because for everything that is unknown there is a proper class of known things that can be used for knowing the unknown. There is a method by which one can discover the unknown from what is known. It is the science of logic. Through it one may know how to obtain the unknown from the known. This science is also concerned with the different kinds of valid, invalid, and near valid inferences. The science of logic is the science of scales. Other sciences are practical, they can give direction in life. The salvation of men lies in their purity of soul. This purity of soul is attainable by contemplating the pure form and avoiding this-worldly inclinations. And the way to these two are through science. And no science which cannot be examined by the balance of logic is certain and exact. Thus, without the acquisition of logic, nothing can be truly called science. Therefore, there is no way except learning the science of logic. It is characteristic of the ancient sciences that the student, at the beginning of his study, is unable to see the use or application of the sciences. This is so, because only after a thorough study of the whole body of science will the real value of his endeavor become apparent. Thus I pray that the reader of this book will not grow impatient in reading things which do not appear of use upon first sight. [pp. 12-15]  ...... Let peace be with those who seek the truth. This is the end of the book of logic. Henceforth, I will talk about metaphysics, that is, theology. [p. 47] End of A Treatise on Logic   1 "Duri" is the first form of the Persian written language. It was the language of rulers at the end of the Sasanian epoch (before the Arabic conquest of Persia) and later developed and was used in the court of the Sasanids in northern and eastern Persia. 2 "Logic which is the science of scales (or canon)," "Logic which is a pure (higher) and formal science," "There is a method by which one can discover the unknown from what is known. It is the science of logic. Through it one may know how to obtain the unknown from the known. This science is also concerned with the different kinds of valid, invalid, and near valid inferences. The science of logic is the science of scales." " And no science which cannot be examined by the balance of logic is certain and exact. Thus, without the acquisition of logic, nothing can be truly called science." Danesh-Name. In his Arabic Shija Avicenna calls Logic an instrument ala of science. In Naiat he writes that "Logic is to speculation as grammar is to discourse and prose to verse." "Logic is an instrument common to all sciences. It is a method for discovery of the unknown from what is known," p. 12. Finally, in the same book he provides a clear answer to the old and vacuous debate whether logic is a part of philosophy or only a tool of philosophy. "If we mean by 'Philosophy' only the science of whatever exists in reality or in the mind, logic is not a part of philosophy. Logic can be an instrument. If one applies the word 'Philosophy' to all speculative research, logic then is a study of a part of Philosophy while serving as an instrument for other sciences." By calling logic 'an instrument' Avicenna follows the Aristotelian logicians who designated the word 'Organon' meaning "instrument,' to refer to Aristotle's logical treatises. By calling it 'scales' Avicenna means that logic weighs the validity and soundness of any argument and since arguments, proofs and demonstrations are an essential part of any science, science (including mathematics) is presupposed by logic. Avicenna shows how various syllogisms are used in Euclidean geometry. See "The Compound Syllogism." The word 'logic' in its modern sense was used by Alexander Aphrodisias 500 years after Aristotle. The Arabic word 'Mantiq' which is used for 'logic,' is a construction of 'Notq' which means 'speech' in Arabic. 3 The epistemological theory on various classes and sub-classes of cognition is not part of logic proper. Though it leads to a logical point concerning the deducibility of "the unknown from what is known." Avicenna states the same opinion also in Isharat. "In the acquisition of the sciences, we use intuitions or judgments. One calls ordinary discourse explicit through the formation of an intuition. One calls it proof through the elaboration of a judgment. Explicit discourse can be either definition or description. Proof is either syllogistic or inductive." The Purpose of Logic, p. 3.

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